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UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
African Regional and
Sub-Regional Systems
Land Rights Case May Have FarReaching Impact for Indigenous
Peoples
In 1973 and 1978, the Kenyan government systematically evicted the seminomadic Endorois people from their traditional lands in the Great Rift Valley. In place
of the approximately 60,000 Endorois who
traditionally used the fertile banks of Lake
Bogoria for cattle herding, the Kenyan government established a wildlife preserve. As
a result, the Endorois were forced onto arid
desert lands where both their livelihood
and culture have dramatically deteriorated.
After nearly forty years without relief, on
February 4, 2010 the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognized
the plight of the Endorois people, finding
the Kenyan government to be in violation
of Articles 1, 8, 14, 17, 21, and 22 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights. The Commission recommended
that Kenya provide the Endorois community both restitution of ancestral lands and
compensation for damage done to their
lands and the community since they were
evicted. The ruling allowed the Kenyan
government three months to implement the
Commission’s recommendations, or potentially face litigation before the African
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Human rights organizations have hailed
the Commission’s decision as a landmark
case for indigenous peoples’ rights and
considered its implications throughout
Africa. In particular, the ruling marks
two developments in Commission jurisprudence: never before has the Commission
recognized an indigenous group to be a
people entitled to benefit from Charter
provisions that protect collective rights;
and never before has the Commission, or
any other international tribunal, declared a
violation of the right to development.
In defining a “people,” the Commission
recognized that “indigenous peoples have
an unambiguous relationship to a distinct
territory and that all attempts to define the
concept [of a people] recognise the linkages

between people, their land, and culture.”
The Commission relied on the Endorois’s
self-identification as a distinct community,
objective features of the Endorois community, and the close interconnection between
their culture, religion, traditional way of
life, and their ancestral lands, as evidence
of the Endorois being a people.
In assessing the right to development under Article 22 of the Charter, the
Commission asserted that there are both
procedural and substantive elements that
must be met to satisfy this right. In this
case, the Kenyan government’s failure to
consult the community and obtain its prior
consent in accordance with its customs
and traditions, and the government’s failure to provide land of equal value to the
land taken violated the Endorois’s right to
development.
If fully implemented, this decision
could have a significant impact on the
Endorois people and far-reaching repercussions throughout Africa. The Commission’s
expanded definition of a “people” and
articulation of the right to development
establish standards that will be applied
in future cases involving other African
indigenous groups who have lost ancestral land through government acquisition.
Most importantly, both components of the
Endorois precedent indicate a shift toward
greater protection of the rights of minorities whose attachment to land is vital but
traditionally outside the mainstream legal
framework for land ownership.

Gambia’s Compliance with the
ECOWAS Court
On February 17, 2010, the Economic
Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice
granted Gambia’s request to postpone
until April 27, 2010 the initial hearing
in the case of Gambian journalist Musa
Saidykhan. In November 2007, the human
rights watchdog Media Foundation for
West Africa initiated the lawsuit against
Gambia on behalf of Saidykhan, who currently resides in exile in the United States.
The complaint alleges that Saidykhan,
former Editor-in-Chief of the Gambian
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Independent, was detained and tortured by
the Gambian National Intelligence Agency
on March 28, 2006, after the newspaper
printed the names of suspects in the March
21 attempted coup d’état. At the initial
hearing, Saidykhan and his doctor were
scheduled to give testimony concerning
the injuries he sustained while in detention.
Although Gambia’s history of contentious
relations with the Court makes implementation of an outcome in Saidykhan’s favor
questionable, Gambia’s continued engagement with the Court and other ECOWAS
organs is reason for optimism.
President Yahya Jammeh has repeatedly sought to limit the effectiveness of the
Court. In a 2008 case with similar facts to
Saidykhan’s, where the Court declared the
Gambian government’s arrest of reporter
Ebrima Manneh “illegal” and urged his
release and compensation, Jammeh refused
to enforce the Court’s ruling. Neither widespread criticism nor the fact that Gambia’s
rejection of the Court’s ruling contravened
Article 24 of the 2005 Supplementary
Protocol of the Court, which makes rulings binding on Member States, induced
Jammeh’s compliance. Separately, in an
effort to limit individuals’ standing before
the Court, in September 2009 Jammeh
attempted to amend the Court’s protocol
to make exhaustion of domestic remedies
a prerequisite.
Notwithstanding Jammeh’s overt protest
of the Court, Gambia’s continued engagement with the Court and other ECOWAS
institutions and agencies may tacitly bolster
the legitimacy of the sub-regional court. By
participating in Court proceedings, even
when such involvement entails submitting
requests for postponement, Gambia demonstrates recognition of the Court’s authority. Indeed, Gambia’s latest maneuver in
the Saidykhan case marks the second occasion on which government lawyers have
contested the proceedings, thereby demonstrating a genuine concern for potential
outcomes. The Court’s legitimacy may also
be augmented by Gambia’s involvement in
other associated ECOWAS organs, such
as the Commission, and its ratification of
ECOWAS treaties. For example, Gambia is
currently undergoing the process of acced-

ing to the 2009 ECOWAS Convention on
Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their
Ammunition, and Other Related Materials.
Gambia’s involvement in ECOWAS organs
and treaties could create interdependencies
between Member States that will enable
effective political pressure to encourage
compliance with the Court’s future rulings.

membership within the regional organization, convened negotiations between coup
leaders and pro-democracy groups, and
marshaled diplomatic pressure from western and African countries. However, over
a year of military rule and grave human
rights abuses transpired before Guinea
returned to democracy.

If Gambia fails to comply with a judgment in the Saidykhan case, sanctions
could result pursuant to Article 77 of the
1993 revised ECOWAS Treaty. The fact
that no sanctions resulted from Gambia’s
non-compliance with the Manneh judgment demonstrates that this power is
not readily invoked. However, Gambia’s
greater involvement in the Saidykhan case
may indicate a change in Gambia’s relationship with the Court, perhaps leading
toward greater compliance.

In Niger, ECOWAS has again assumed
a central role. It suspended Niger’s membership in October 2009 because Tandja
dissolved Parliament and the Constitutional
Court flouted Niger’s obligation to promote
democratic governance under Article 4(j) of
the ECOWAS Revised Treaty. Additionally,
since several months before the coup,
ECOWAS has coordinated diplomatic
efforts to resolve tensions in Niger through
negotiations. However, the recent coup represents a significant setback to ECOWAS’s
pre-coup diplomacy, and it is uncertain
whether negotiations and sanctions alone
will restore democracy in Niger.

A Developing ECOWAS Provides
Hope for Restoration of Democracy
in Niger
On February 18, 2010, Niger experienced its third coup d’état in fourteen
years. The coup was a response to President
Mamadou Tandja’s bid to retain the presidency for a third term in violation of the
1999 Constitution of the Fifth Republic
of Niger. News reports suggest that the
coup was welcomed in Niger, as pro-coup
demonstrators took to the streets in celebration. However, reaction from the international community was far less jubilant.
The African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) adopted a resolution condemning the coup as a violation
of Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act of
the African Union (AU). Additionally, UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a
statement disapproving of the unconstitutional change of government. Now that the
coup’s leaders are at the helm of Niger’s
central government, it is unclear how soon
Niger will return to democratic rule and
what tools may be available to Nigeriens to
ensure this transition takes place.
ECOWAS, through its capacity to coordinate diplomatic negotiations, impose
sanctions, and conduct trials, is uniquely
positioned to facilitate such a transition.
Indeed, ECOWAS played a central role
in Guinea’s return to democratic rule in
February 2010 following a December 2008
military coup after the death of General
Lasana Conté, Guinea’s dictatorial leader
of 24 years. ECOWAS suspended Guinea’s

In this context, the ECOWAS
Community Court of Justice represents
one additional mechanism that could be
employed to encourage a return to democratic rule. With wide jurisdictional leeway
to pursue cases of human rights violations and broad access to the court for
individuals pursuant to Articles 9(4) and
10(d) of the 2005 Supplementary Protocol
(A/SP.1/01/05), the Court is well situated
to hear a case challenging the legality of
the military junta under Article 13 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights. Moreover, as seen in the ECOWAS
case of Ugokwe v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria (Unreported Suit No. ECW/CCJ/
APP/02/05), a claim can be filed before
the Court based on alleged violations of
the African Charter and the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights relating to
national elections. If successful in restoring
democracy in Niger — whether through
legal action or diplomacy and sanctions —
ECOWAS’s growing role in West Africa
could serve as a model to other subregional organizations on the continent.
Andrew W. Maki, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the African Regional and
Sub-Regional Systems for the Human
Rights Brief.

European Court of Human Rights
UK’s “Stop and Search” Policy
Declared a Human Rights Violation
On January 12, 2010, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) determined that Sections 44-45 of the United
Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 (Terrorism
Act), which provide police with significant
discretion to “stop and search” individuals,
violate the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). In Gillan and Quinton
v. United Kingdom, police independently
stopped the applicants, two British citizens,
and searched their personal belongings during a protest at an arms fair on September
9, 2003. Each detention lasted less than
thirty minutes, and when neither search
revealed any incriminating evidence, the
officers released the applicants. In each
instance, the only explanation for apprehending the applicants was the exercise of
the Terrorism Act’s stop-and-search powers. The applicants alleged violations of
four provisions of the Convention: Article
5 (the right to liberty and security); Article
8 (the right to respect for private and family
life); Article 10 (freedom of expression);
and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and
association).
The Terrorism Act, signed into law in
February 2001, affords police officers wide
discretion to stop and search individuals
without reasonable suspicion if the officers
believe apprehension would be “expedient
for the prevention of acts of terrorism.”
Officers ranked as assistant chief constable
or higher may assign subordinates a geographic zone of a public area within which
to conduct searches. Section 45(2) allows
the officers to apprehend anyone within
their assigned area to search for “articles
of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism,” even absent grounds
for suspicion. Although Section 45(3) prohibits police from “requir[ing] a person
to remove any clothing in public except
for headgear, footwear, an outer coat, a
jacket or gloves,” a Code of Practice (Code
A) issued by the UK Secretary of State
permits more invasive public searches.
Under Code A, the Terrorism Act does not
“prevent an officer from placing his or her
hand inside the pockets of the outer clothing, . . . collars, socks and shoes,” or from
searching a person’s hair.
Using a two-part test, the ECtHR held
that the stop-and-search police power of
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sections 44 and 45 of the Terrorism Act
violates ECHR Article 8 and, therefore, did
not consider the applicants’ other claims.
Applying the first prong, the Court found
that the Terrorism Act interferes with the
right to respect for private and family life,
notwithstanding the fact that most searches
under the Terrorism Act occur in public.
Noting that Article 8 encompasses an individual’s interactions with others, even those
occurring in public, the decision labels the
law “a clear interference” with Article 8
because it subjects individuals to such personal searches in public areas, leading to
embarrassment of those searched.
Second, the Court found that the interference was not “in accordance with the
law” because it did not provide “adequate
legal safeguards” to protect “against arbitrary interference” with an individual’s
Article 8 rights. The section 44 requirement that searches be “expedient” in preventing terrorism is too broad, according to the Court. Reading “expedient” to
mean only “helpful” or “advantageous,”
the Court held that this section reserves too
much discretion for police in apprehending
and searching individuals.
The decision expresses particular concern over use of the stop-and-search provisions to target racial minorities and political
activists. From 2007 to 2008, despite the
fact that Caucasians composed 92.1 percent
of the UK’s population, only 61 percent
of pedestrians stopped under Section 44
were Caucasian. Additionally, the ECtHR
cites a study by the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Human Rights indicating
abuse of Section 44 in detaining journalists
and protestors at events garnering political
attention, such as the arms fair where the
police apprehended the applicants.
This decision fuels the debate over the
continually shifting line between preventing terrorism and preserving individual
rights, particularly because Article 8 allows
public officials to interfere with the right
to privacy to protect the security and wellbeing of the state and its citizens. David
Hanson, the Minister of State for Crime
and Policing at the UK’s Home Office,
argued that the Act’s stop and search was
“an important tool” used in the UK’s
“ongoing fight against terrorism.” Rights
groups including Liberty, which provided
counsel to the applicants, called on the
government to “tighten up the law without
delay.” The UK plans to appeal the decision

The European Court of Human
Rights Scrutinizes Italy’s Asylum
Policy
The European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) is considering a landmark lawsuit against Italy filed by a group of
asylum seekers originating from Somalia
and Eritrea (Hirsi and Others v. Italy,
Application No. 27765/09).
Since May 2009, Italy’s “push-back
policy,” whereby mainly African people
trying to reach Italian shores by boat are
intercepted in international waters and
brought to other countries such as Libya,
led to the return of at least 900 individuals in only two months. This policy
failed to guarantee the examination of
asylum seekers’ possible claims. However,
according to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
a substantial number of people from this
group are in need of international protection. Several international organizations, such as the UNHCR, Amnesty
International, and Human Rights Watch,
have criticized Italy’s push-back practices.
The lawsuit before the ECtHR was
initiated in July 2009 by 24 asylum
seekers who were transferred to Libya
after being intercepted. One of them
subsequently died in another attempt to
reach the Italian coast in November 2009.
Some of the plaintiffs are currently living
in detention centers or overcrowded prisons, susceptible to ill-treatment.
According to Anton Giulio Lana,
a Rome-based lawyer representing the
plaintiffs, Italy’s policy violates three
provisions of the European Convention

to the ECtHR Grand Chamber and will
continue using the stop-and-search provisions until the appeal is resolved.

EU to Join the European Convention
on Human Rights: A Step Forward
or Backward in Resolving Human
Rights Violations?
On March 17, 2010, the European
Commission proposed directives for negotiations on the European Union’s forthcoming accession to the ECHR. While the
ECHR already binds each individual EU
Member State to secure the rights articulated in its articles, the EU and its institu60

on Human Rights (ECHR): the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment (Article 3); the prohibition of
collective expulsion of aliens (Article 4
of Protocol 4 to the ECHR); and the right
to an effective legal remedy (Article 13).
Italy gave its statement to the ECtHR
in April 2010. The plaintiffs have one
month to reply, after which the Court will
make its decision, hopefully in a reasonable time. The UNHCR has submitted a
written intervention as a third party to
the ECtHR, concluding that “by returning persons to Libya without an adequate
assessment of their protection needs, the
Italian authorities appear not to have sufficiently taken into account the potential
risk of refoulement, including indirect
refoulement, and other possible violations of fundamental rights upon return
of the affected persons to Libya.”
This case is extremely important as
it is the first time that the ECtHR will
examine the practice of intercepting and
returning migrants without human rights
guarantees. Such policies are carried out
not only by Italy, but also by Spain and
Greece. If the Court decides in favor of
the applicants, many more similar cases
may be filed.
Editor’s Note: For more information on
the controversial Italian interdiction
policy, see Annamaria Racota, Europe:
Italy’s Immigration Policy Faces New
Criticism, 17 No. 1 Hum. Rts. Brief 45.
Michèle Morel, a Ph.D. researcher at
Ghent University, Belgium, contributed
this column on the European Court of
Human Rights to the Human Rights Brief.
tions would also be bound and subject to
suit before the ECtHR after accession is
complete. This step represents a significant
milestone in the integration of European
international organizations, since the
ECtHR is a subsidiary of the Council of
Europe, which is an independent political
organization from the EU.
After a 1996 European Court of Justice
decision rejected accession for lack of
treaty support, EU accession became
legally permissible and also mandatory
under the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into
force on December 1, 2009. Protocol 14
to the ECHR, which will enter into force
in June 2010, also permits the EU’s acces-

sion. Although neither document makes the
EU a member of the Council of Europe, the
Lisbon Treaty does allow the EU to receive
representation on the ECtHR, representation and votes in the Council of Ministers
on issues related to the Court, and representation on the Parliamentary Assembly
when it selects judges for the ECtHR.
In a 2009 draft report, the European
Parliament enumerated several benefits
of EU accession to the ECHR. Once the
EU is bound by the ECHR, individual
citizens and Member States may bring
complaints against the EU and its institutions for acts believed to be incompatible
with the Convention, thereby expanding
human rights protections. Politically, the
Commission expects the move will harmonize both the law of the European Court
of Human Rights and the European Court
of Justice, and the policies of the EU and
the Council of Europe. Furthermore, binding the EU to the ECHR will potentially
“enhance the credibility of the [EU]” in its
negotiations with third countries; non-EU
Member States will be more likely to heed
the EU’s call for adherence to the ECHR
and decisions of the ECtHR if the EU itself
is also bound.
While José Manuel Barroso, President
of the European Commission, believes the
accession holds “political, legal and symbolic importance,” the process is not without flaws. The ECtHR already struggles
with an ever-growing caseload. Adding an
entire international organization to the list
of parties that may be sued will — to say
the least — not help solve this problem.
The Parliament’s draft report acknowledged that unless the structure of the
ECtHR is amended to alleviate the burden
of “the excessive workload” and repetitive
cases on the Court, “the system is in danger of collapse.” The draft report relies on
Protocol 14 to ameliorate this problem. To
improve efficiency and allow the Court to
cope with the increasing caseload, Protocol
14 allows for three-judge committees to
issue judgments and for a single judge
to determine admissibility. Because the
Protocol 14 reforms have not yet entered
into force, however, its effect on the Court’s
efficiency remains unknown.
EU accession will afford greater potential to redress human rights violations in
Europe. According to President Barroso,
“The EU’s accession to the European
Convention on Human Rights will pro-

vide a coherent system of fundamental
rights protection throughout the continent,”
ensuring compliance with the ECHR by the
EU institutions and symbolizing Europe’s
universal commitment to preserving
human rights. The accession will become
official upon the unanimous approval of
the Commission’s directives by both the
Council and all 47 current States Parties
to the ECHR, and with the Parliament’s
permission.

Grand Chamber to Examine Death of
G8 Protestor
A five-judge panel of the ECtHR Grand
Chamber accepted referral requests by
both the Italian government and the parents
of Carlo Giuliani, an Italian protester killed
at the 2001 Group of Eight conference
in Genoa, Italy. On August 25, 2009, the
Court issued a Chamber judgment finding that Italy violated Article 2, the right
to life, by failing to conduct an adequate
investigation of the incident. The Court did
not, however, find that the officer who shot
Giuliani used excessive force.
Following the Chamber judgment,
Giuliani’s parents vowed to challenge the
latter finding, seeking to hold the state
responsible for the carabiniere’s excessive
use of force. The Chamber was unable
to find for the applicants on this issue
because Giuliani’s body had been cremated and the scene of the shooting altered
before adequate ballistic investigation
could be conducted. Therefore, a finding
by the Grand Chamber that the carabiniere
applied excessive force appears unlikely.
The appeal hearing is set for September
29, 2010.
Editor’s Note: For a complete analysis of
the Court’s decision, see Whitney Hayes,
European Court of Human Rights: Death
of Italian G8 Protester Not a Violation of
Right to Life, 17 No. 1 Hum. Rts. Brief 59.
Whitney Hayes, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the European Court of
Human Rights for the Human Rights Brief.

Inter-American System
IACtHR Finds Mexico Violated
Convention on Eradication of
Violence against Women
On November 16, 2009, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
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issued an opinion finding Mexico violated
the American Convention of Human Rights
(ACHR) for failing to effectively investigate, prosecute, and prevent the murders
of Claudia Ivette González, Esmeralda
Herrera Monreal, and Laura Berenice
Ramos Monárrez.
In González and others (“Campo
Algodonero or Cotton Field”) v. México,
the Court established jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases based on violations of
the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women (Convention of
Belém do Pará), which Mexico ratified on
November 12, 1998.
Two of the three female victims in
Campo Algodonero were minors. All three
bodies were discovered on November 2001
in an abandoned cotton field. These murders are among many cases of disappearance, rape, and murder of women and girls
in Ciudad Juárez, a city on the U.S.-Mexico
border. Unfortunately, many of these cases
have been poorly investigated by Mexican
authorities and remain unsolved. The irregular prosecution, investigation, and prevention of these crimes has led to widespread
impunity and continued serious genderbased violence against women and girls in
Ciudad Juárez.
Following the IACtHR’s landmark decision in Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras,
Campo Algodonero underscores that states
can be liable under international human
rights law for failing to exercise due diligence when investigating and responding
to gender-based violence committed by
private actors. In other words, even though
the Court could not find that the murders were committed through state action,
Campo Algodonero holds Mexico internationally responsible for failing to effectively prevent, investigate, and prosecute
the murders of the three women.
Article 1 of the ACHR provides that
States Parties have the obligation to respect
the rights in the Convention. This obligation includes the duty to ensure that all
persons subject to its jurisdiction have free
and full exercise of the rights and freedoms
without any discrimination on the basis of
gender, race, or any other social condition.
Article 2 of the ACHR declares that States
Parties have a duty to adopt legislative or
any other measures as may be necessary
to give effect to the rights and freedoms
recognized by the Convention. In Campo

Algodonero, the Court found that Mexico
violated the ACHR by failing to guarantee,
protect, respect, and adopt necessary measures to give effect to the Convention, specifically its guarantees of the rights to life,
humane treatment, and personal liberty.
Remarkably, the Court also decided
for the first time whether it had jurisdiction to hear claims based on violations of
the Convention of Belém do Pará. Mexico
argued that the IACtHR did not have
jurisdiction because the Convention of
Belém do Pará did not specifically grant it
such jurisdiction. The IACtHR disagreed,
explaining that international human rights
law is composed of both a set of rules and
a set of values. In this case, the IACtHR
interpreted the rules that determine jurisdiction of the Convention of Belém do Pará
by taking into account the values the InterAmerican System intends to safeguard and
protect.
Campo Algodonero also recognized that
gender-specific violence can constitute
femicide and allocated state responsibility for failing to protect women from such
violence. Femicide is an extreme form of
violence against women; it is the murder of
girls and women for the sole reason of their
gender. In Campo Algodonero, the Court
concluded that the petitioners were victims of violence against women and held
Mexico responsible for failing to prevent
these crimes because the Mexican government was aware of the pattern of violence
yet it failed to prevent it.

IACtHR Condemns Use of
Mandatory Death Penalty in
Barbados
The IACtHR found that Barbados’s
violated Tyrone DaCosta Cadogan’s rights
guaranteed under Articles 4 (right to life)
and 8 (right to fair trial) of the ACHR
when it sentenced him to death by hanging, pursuant to a Barbadian statute that
requires capital punishment for murder.
DaCosta Cadogan v. Barbados, decided
September 24, 2009, is the second time
the tribunal denounced a Barbadian statute requiring the death penalty in murder
cases. Significantly, the Court considered
for the first time whether a law that only
makes available, rather than requiring, a
psychiatric evaluation for a defendant facing the death penalty satisfies due process
requirements under Article 8 of the ACHR.

Article 8 of the ACHR requires states
to ensure that every person has the right to
a hearing with due guarantees and within
a reasonable time by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal previously
established by law. This obligation is most
exacting when the death penalty may be
imposed.
During proceedings before the IACtHR,
Cadogan was evaluated and diagnosed with
personality disorder as well as alcohol
dependence. However, during his criminal
trial in Barbados, he was not evaluated by
a mental health professional. The Court
found that the state violated Cadogan’s
right to a fair trial because neither the trial
judge nor the defense attorney requested a
psychiatric evaluation, which could have
allowed Cadogan to raise the defense of
diminished responsibility.
While Barbadian law provides that all
criminal defendants are entitled to a full
psychiatric evaluation by a state-employed
mental health professional, the judge is not
required to request or explicitly inform the
accused that the evaluation is available.
The state’s passive conduct in Cadogan, the
IACtHR held, constituted a violation of the
defendant’s right to a fair trial. Even though
the state’s omission may not have violated
due process rights in other criminal proceedings, Cadogan’s case demanded the
most ample and strict observation of due
process because it involved the possibility
of a mandatory death sentence. Moreover,
considering Cadogan was afforded stateappointed legal, the judge had the duty to
adopt a more active role in ensuring that
all necessary measures were carried out in
order to guarantee a fair trial. The Court
explained that Cadogan’s particular situation at the time of the offense reasonably
required at least an assessment of whether
alcohol dependency or some personality
disorder existed, especially because the
judge submitted before the jury the issue of
the effect that alcohol and drugs may have
had on the accused’s mental state.
Cadogan’s broad interpretation of the
state’s obligation to ensure due process to
include the mandatory offer of a mental
health evaluation in a capital punishment
case is remarkable in that it creates an
affirmative obligation on the state not only
to ensure that all criminals are able to have
a free and full psychiatric evaluation by a
state-employed mental health professional,
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but also that they are aware that this evaluation is available prior to judgment.

IACHR Condemns Vagueness of
Amnesty Decree in Honduras
On January 27, 2010, Honduran
president Porfirio Lobo Sosa signed
an Amnesty Decree (Decree No. 2) for
political and common crimes committed
between January 1, 2008 and January 27,
2010, a period of civil strife that followed
the coup d’état that deposed the democratically-elected President José Manuel
Zelaya. Amnesty International reported
serious human rights abuses during these
months, including arbitrary arrests, police
and military abuse, suppression of speech,
and several episodes of violence against
women.
On February 3, 2010, the IACHR
expressed concern with the Amnesty
Decree, noting that its ambiguous language did not establish precise criteria or
a concrete mechanism for its application.
It urged Honduran authorities to review the
decree and remember Honduras’s obligations under international law.
The IACHR’s concern is warranted
as the Decree could result in widespread
impunity of serious human rights violations. Moreover, the IACHR noted that
amnesty laws that hinder access to justice
in cases involving serious human right violations contravene Honduras’s obligations
under the ACHR. As a State Party to the
ACHR, Honduras is required to ensure that
its laws do not deprive victims of serious
human rights violations access to justice.
Moreover, it may not invoke existing provisions of domestic law, such as an amnesty
decree, to avoid complying with its obligations under international law. Honduras
may therefore not use the Amnesty Decree
to justify its failure to prosecute and punish
human rights violations.
Daniela X. Cornejo, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Inter-American System
for the Human Rights Brief.

Dinah Shelton was recently elected
to serve as one of seven members of the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, and is the first woman to be nominated by the United States for this position.
Shelton has experience advising and working with regional human rights systems,
has authored countless articles and books
on human rights law, and is a professor at George Washington University Law
School.
Human Rights Brief: You have a very
broad perspective on regional protection of
human rights. We have textbooks of yours
that are volumes long. How do you see this
new role with the Commission fitting into
your overall work and how did you come to
this point in your career?
Dinah Shelton: It is certainly a different role. When you sit outside and look
at the Commission, comparing it to other
human rights bodies, you can have the
outsider perspective to critique areas in
which you see some real problems. When
you get inside, you see the source of those
problems and you see that perhaps in some
areas it is easy to move relatively quickly
to correct them and other areas where it is
a more long-term and perhaps intractable
problem.
HRB: What do you see coming up in
the short-term future?
D.S.: One of the problems is that
the Commission is a part-time body and
human rights problems are not. So, when
you have a seven-member Commission and
none of the members of the Commission
live in Washington, D.C., it means that the
Commission members themselves have
limited interaction with the staff, with the
files, with the pleadings and the memos
that are deposited, etc. And, of course we
all have our day jobs, which is another
problem. I think we are all trying to be
more proactive in terms of looking at the
cases that come in. I think we have a very
collegial committee right now, and one that
is eager to make the process work as best
it can.
HRB: Are there any particular areas
of focus that you would like to see given

attention in the Commission during these
next few years?
D.S.: We each have our country rapporteurships and a thematic rapporteurship.
I have the rights of indigenous peoples,
which alone would keep me busy if that
were the only thing I had to do in the next
four years. One of the striking things about
this first session of the Commission [in
March 2010] is the high level of representation governments are sending to the hearings. It is not like twenty years ago when
governments, on the whole, never really
responded to the Commission. I think it
gives us more of an opportunity to promote
human rights instead of trying to put out
major forest fires.
There is a third pillar, along with
human rights and democracy, that I think
is critically important, and that I think
the Commission is going to start looking
at in more depth: the rule of law. When
you put together the components of a just
society, you want human rights, democracy, and rule of law. But, until recently,
rule of law has not gotten the same focus
as democracy and human rights. Some of
the problems that continue to occur within
the hemisphere are very closely linked in
many countries to problems with the lack
of an independent and competent judiciary.
I think this is something that some of the
new members on the Commission have
given high priority.
HRB: At the end of 2009, the Court
issued new Rules of Procedure with a
somewhat new role for the Commission.
It also mentioned the creation of an
Inter-American public defender as part
of the reforms. Do you see any changes
or challenges in the adjustment of the
Commission’s role in proceedings before
the Court?
D.S.: Not really. Actually, I think it may
improve consideration of cases because
as the role of individuals and their representatives before the Court has increased,
their focus is on repairing the harm to
the individuals involved in the case. The
Commission’s role becomes, then, increasingly one similar to a ministerio público
(a governmental office in many Latin
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American countries that performs functions similar to those of a public prosecutor). That is, the Commission has taken on
the role of upholding the public interest in
the hemisphere, looking not back at what
happened to the victim so much as forward
to changes in law and practice in the particular society.
I see these two roles as very complementary and the adjustment really allows
the Commission to focus on the changes
that need to be made as we look forward in
trying to prevent human rights violations
from occurring again. Of course, one of
the developments is the creation of a Legal
Defense Fund to help litigants, and we’re
still in the process of figuring how that’s
going to operate. But, I think that if the
appellants get experienced representation,
that again will just enhance the proceedings before the Court.
HRB: A lot of the earlier discussions
in the Inter-American human rights system
compared it to the European human rights
system, which eventually merged their
versions of the Court and Commission.
Are there particular advantages for the
Inter-American system of maintaining two
human rights bodies?
D.S.: Absolutely. We should never
go the European route. In the European
context, until recently, my guess would
be that 90 to 95 percent of cases were
purely issues of law. There was no factual disagreement whatsoever between
the petitioners and the government. The
only question was, “Is this particular law

or this particular practice in violation of
the Convention?” It is the reverse in the
Inter-American system where, in cases of
alleged extrajudicial killings or disappearances, the facts are critical. If you have
1,200 cases and the facts are in dispute
in 95 percent of them, the Inter-American
Court would never be able to do the kind
of fact-finding necessary, and would be
relying almost entirely on presumptions
and inferences.
I think one of the advantages the
Commission has now is that several countries have an open-door policy. We can
go any time we want to look into issues
that may come up in the context of a particular case. I think the fact-finding the
Commission does is really critical to the
whole system being able to function.
HRB: How was the nomination process
going into the Commission?
D.S.: I was nominated in March 2009.
There is really a role for NGOs and human
rights advocates to play in this process.
Normally there are discussions within
the U.S. Mission to the Organization of
American States (OAS) and within the legal

department of the U.S. State Department
about people who are within the realm of
possibility as nominees.
And then, of course, there is the threemonth campaign between the nomination and the actual election. That, again,
involves meeting with NGOs to elicit support and trying to get them to contact their
counterparts in other countries, because it’s
an election by 34 of the 35 Member States.
(Cuba does not participate.) So, we make
the rounds to all the state missions to the
OAS and speak with the different ambassadors and legal advisors, answer their
questions, and make public presentations.
In my election it came down to the final
ballot because the two candidates vying
for the third seat were tied with one vote
left to count. So, it was tense. It was closer
than past elections we have had. I will say
that I found the campaign extremely useful
because I could hear the concerns of each
of the different countries. So, it did not just
serve the nomination process but it also
prepared me to sit on the Commission now.
I think the only unfortunate thing,
although I really like my two new col-

leagues, is that the person1 who lost the
election was a nominee for a second term.
There is certainly a perception among
many that the reason that he did not get
a second term was that he was too good,
and that because he was the rapporteur on
a couple of the countries2 that are among
those most seriously criticized today. There
was a campaign against him to make him
personally pay for the human rights work
that he had done, and it was a successful campaign. So, that is a bit disturbing.
I think that the new commissioners who
have come in, if they want to do their job
well, have to take the position that they
are not concerned about their second term.
Because if they are, they will not do the job
that they are supposed to do.
Charles Abbott, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of
Law and an M.A. candidate at the American
University School of International Service,
and Santiago Vázquez, an LL.M. student
at the American University Washington
College of Law, collaborated on this interview for the Human Rights Brief. Both are
Dean’s Fellows at the Academy on Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law.
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Editor’s Note: Victor Abramovich served as a Commissioner
from Argentina and was the Second Vice-President of the InterAmerican Commission. He won 19 of the 20 votes needed to win
reelection.

Abramovich was the thematic rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples
and was a country rapporteur for Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua. See Organization of American States,
Biographies of OAS Officials: Victor Abromovich, http://www.oas.
org/documents/spa/biography_Victor_Abramovich.asp.
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